We give a new proof of a theorem of Mints that the positive fragment of minimal predicate logic is decidable. The idea of the proof is to replace the eigenvariable condition of sequent calculus by an appropriate scoping mechanism. The algorithm given by this proof seems to be more practical than that given by the original proof. A naive implementation is given at the end of the paper. Another contribution is to show that this result extends to a large class of theories, including simple type theory (higherorder logic) and second-order propositional logic. We obtain this way a new proof of the decidability of the inhabitation problem for positive types in system F.
Introduction
In classical propositional logic, the rules of sequent calculus can be chosen in order to commute with contraction and thus a sequent has a derivation if and only if it has a cut-free contraction-free derivation. The search space for cutfree contraction-free derivations is finite and hence classical propositional logic is decidable.
In minimal propositional logic, the left rule of the implication does not commute with contraction anymore and thus to remain complete when searching for a derivation, we have to duplicate an implication occurring in the left part of a sequent before we decompose it. For instance, to prove the formula ((((P → Q) → P ) → P ) → Q) → Q it is necessary to use the formula (((P → Q) → P ) → P ) → Q twice (see Definition 1.3 below for the sequent calculus used in this paper).
L → (((P → Q) → P ) → P ) → Q, (P → Q) → P, P P R → (((P → Q) → P ) → P ) → Q, (P → Q) → P, P ((P → Q) → P ) → P L → (((P → Q) → P ) → P ) → Q, (P → Q) → P, P Q R → (((P → Q) → P ) → P ) → Q, (P → Q) → P P → Q L → (((P → Q) → P ) → P ) → Q, (P → Q) → P P R → (((P → Q) → P ) → P ) → Q ((P → Q) → P ) → P L → (((P → Q) → P ) → P ) → Q Q R → ((((P → Q) → P ) → P ) → Q) → Q This derivation yields the long normal proof-term λα (((P →Q)→P )→P )→Q (α λβ (P →Q)→P (β λγ P (α λβ (P →Q)→P γ)))
where the variable α is used twice. Thus, the decidability of minimal propositional logic is not as obvious as that of classical propositional logic, and to design a decision algorithm for minimal propositional logic or for the inhabitation problem in simply typed lambdacalculus, we need either to restrict to non redundant proofs, as, for instance, in [9] , or to specialize sequent calculus to avoid this left rule of the implication, as for instance, in [6] .
When we extend classical propositional logic by allowing positive quantifiers (i.e. universal quantifiers at positive occurrences and existential quantifiers at negative occurrences), we need to introduce two more rules in sequent calculus: the right rule of the universal quantifier and the left rule of the existential quantifier. These rules also commute with contraction, hence, the positive fragment of classical predicate logic is decidable too. Another way to put the argument is that, in classical logic, any formula with positive quantifiers can be transformed into a prenex universal formula, hence provability in the positive fragment can be reduced to provability in the propositional fragment.
If we have negative quantifiers also, we need to introduce two more rules: the left rule of the universal quantifier and the right rule of the existential quantifier. These rules do not commute with contraction and the decidability result does not extend. The fact that, in classical predicate logic, contraction needs to be applied only below these two rules can be seen as a formulation of Herbrand's theorem.
When we extend minimal propositional logic with positive quantifiers, the 2 situation is again more complicated. For instance in the derivation
where A is the formula (∀x (((Q → R) → Q) → P (x) → Q)) → R, we need to rename the variable x into x when applying the right rule of the universal quantifier for the second time. The proof-term associated to this derivation is
Thus, not only α occurs twice in this term, but also each occurrence yields a different bound variable: x and x . Hence the formulae that may occur in the derivations are not in a finite space anymore and, even when restricted to non redundant proofs, proof search may fail to terminate. For instance, searching for a derivation of the formula
we develop the following attempt where A is the formula (∀x (P (x) → Q)) → Q.
In this attempt, we accumulate formulae P (x), P (x ), P (x ), ... and naive restriction to non redundant proofs fails to prune this branch. Notice that, in minimal predicate logic, the provability of a formula is not equivalent to the provability of its prenex form, so we cannot reduce provability in the positive fragment to provability in the propositional fragment by putting the formula to be proved in prenex form. For instance, the formula
where R(y, x) = P (y) → P (x) and R(y, z) = P (y) → P (z), is not derivable, although its prenex form
is.
Mints [10] proves that, in the positive fragment of intuitionistic predicate logic, a provable formula always has a derivation with less than n variables, where n is a bound computed as a function of the formula. This way, the search space can be restricted to be finite and hence the positive fragment of intuitionistic predicate calculus is proved to be decidable.
We know that, in logic, variable names are irrelevant and that replacing named variables by another scoping mechanism, such as de Bruijn indices [1] , simplifies formalisms very often.
The goal of this paper is to replace the eigenvariable condition of the sequent calculus, that forces to rename bound variables and to invent new variable names, by an alternative scoping mechanism. We obtain this way an alternative decision algorithm for the positive fragment of minimal predicate logic, where the search space is restricted just by restricting to non redundant proofs, like in the propositional case. A naive implementation of this algorithm is given at the end of the paper.
For sake of simplicity, we consider only minimal logic in this paper, but the method developed should extend smoothly to full intuitionistic logic. However, we leave this extension for future work.
Finally, we show that our decidability result extends to simple type theory (higher-order logic) and to system F. We obtain this way a new algorithm testing inhabitation of positive types in system F [8] .
Notice that the encoding of traditional data types in system F (such as the empty data type ∀X X, booleans ∀X (X → (X → X)) and natural numbers ∀X (X → ((X → X) → X))) are positive types. Thus this decidability result raises the question of the possibility to consider all positive types as extended data types.
A preliminary version of this paper appeared in [4] . The system presented in this paper is simpler than that of [4] because we deal directly with variables instead of using the technical notion of level previously used.
Positive formulae
In minimal predicate logic, the syntax of terms and formulae is given by
Superfluous parentheses are omitted as usual. Free and bound occurrences of variables in a formula are defined as usual.
Formally, a formula A is a tree, whose nodes are labeled with either an atomic formula P (t 1 , ..., t n ) or the symbol → or else the quantifier ∀ and a variable.
To each position in such a tree, we associate a formula. These formulae are called the pieces of A. For instance the pieces of the formula ∀x (P (x) → Q) are ∀x (P (x) → Q), P (x) → Q, P (x) and Q. Notice that this notion of piece is different from the usual notion of sub-formula, as we cannot substitute for the variables in pieces.
A LJ + -context is a finite multiset of formulae. A LJ + -sequent Γ A is a pair formed by a context Γ and a formula A. Definition 1.1 (Free and bound variables of a context) Free and bound variables of a context are defined by
A formula in minimal predicate logic is positive if all its universal quantifier occurrences are positive. More precisely, the set of positive and negative formulae are defined by induction as follows.
Definition 1.2 (Positive and negative formulae and sequents)
• An atomic formula is positive and negative,
• a formula of the form A → B is positive (resp. negative) if A is negative (resp. positive) and B is positive (resp. negative),
• a formula of the form ∀x A is positive if A is positive,
• a sequent A 1 , ..., A n B is positive if A 1 , ..., A n are negative and B is positive.
Notice that a formula of the form ∀x A is never negative. Proposition 1.1 A negative formula has the form A 1 → ... → A n → P where P is an atomic formula and A 1 , ..., A n are positive formulae.
We use a cut-free sequent calculus for positive sequents in minimal predicate logic. Instead of the usual axiom rule Γ, A A and left rule for implication
we take a more restricted rule, in the style of Howard,
where P is an atomic formula. This way, derivations can be directly translated to long normal proofs in natural deduction, and the formula A 1 → ... → A n → P is the type of the head variable of the associated proof-term. The equivalence of this system with that having the usual axiom and L → rules is straightforward.
In this sequent calculus, formulae are, as usual, identified modulo α-equivalence. Definition 1.3 (LJ + , A sequent calculus for positive sequents)
LJB : a sequent calculus with brackets
In LJ + , when we have a sequent of the form Γ ∀x A, we may need to rename the variable x with a variable x that is free neither in Γ nor in A in order to apply the R∀ rule. We introduce now another sequent calculus, where, instead of renaming the variable x, we bind it in the context Γ with brackets and obtain the sequent [Γ] x A.
In fact, we will bind in Γ, not only the variable x, but also all the variables bound in A. Although binding x only and binding all the variables bound in ∀x A both yield a sound and complete system, this second choice allows to prove termination of proof search. Definition 2.1 (LJB-contexts and items) LJB-contexts and items are mutually inductively defined as follows.
• A LJB-context Γ is a finite multiset of items {I 1 , ..., I n },
• an item I is either a formula or an expression of the form [Γ] V where V is a set of variables and Γ a context.
In the item [Γ]
V the variables of V are bound by the symbol [ ].
Definition 2.2 (Free and bound variables of a LJB-context and of an item)
The set of free variables of a LJB-context is defined by
and the set of free variables of an item by
The set of bound variables of a LJB-context is defined by
and the set of bound variables of an item by
A LJB-sequent Γ A is a pair formed by a LJB-context Γ and a formula A. The system LJB is formed by two sets of rules: the usual deduction rules and additional transformation rules. The transformation rules deal with bracket manipulation. They form a terminating rewrite system. The first transformation rule allows to replace an item of the form [I, Γ] V by the two items I and [Γ] V provided no free variable of I is in V . The second rule allows to remove trivial items. The third rule to replace two identical items by one.
Definition 2.3 (Cleaning LJB-contexts)
We consider the following rules simplifying LJB-contexts, where I is a item and Γ a LJB-context.
As usual, these rules may be applied anywhere in a LJB-context.
Proposition 2.1 (Termination)
The rewrite system of Definition 2.3 terminates.
Proof. We check that the following interpretation decreases
The confluence of this system is more tricky. Indeed, although it is quite simple, this rewrite system is defined modulo associativity and commutativity (as contexts are multisets), it contains a binding symbol and it is non linear. Thus, instead of proving confluence, we shall fix an arbitrary strategy and define the normal form Γ ↓ of a context Γ as the normal form relative to this strategy.
We now turn to the deduction rules. These rules apply only to normal LJBsequents where in each formula the bound variables are distinct and distinct from all the free variables. It is easy to check that these properties are preserved by the rules. Notice also that in LJB we deal with formulae, not formulae modulo α-equivalence.
Definition 2.4 (LJB, A sequent calculus with brackets)
P is atomic and has no free variable in
where V is the set of all variables bound in ∀x A
In the L → rule, brackets are moved from some items of the LJB-context to others, bringing the formula A 1 → ... → A n → P inside brackets to the surface, so that it can be used. For instance the LJB-sequent
The crucial point is that the two occurrences of x in Q(x) and Q(x) → P that are separated in the first LJB-sequent remain separated. This idea is made precise in Proposition 3.4.
When i = 1 the L → rule degenerates to
Example. Let us try again to prove the formula
We obtain the following attempt
where A is the formula (∀x (P (x) → Q)) → Q. Now, instead of accumulating formulae P (x), P (x ), P (x ), ... we accumulate items [P (x)] x , that collapse by context cleaning. Thus, the LJB-sequent A, [P (x)] x , P (x) Q is repeated and restricting to non redundant proofs prunes this branch. Example. Let us try now a slightly more involved example
At this point, we have two possibilities. Either we use the L → rule with the formula P (x) → Q and we have to prove the LJB-sequent A, P (x) → Q P (x) to which no rule applies, or we use this same rule with the formula A and we have to prove the LJB-sequent A, P (x) → Q ∀x ((P (x) → Q) → Q), in this case the search continues as follows
At this point, we have three possibilities. The first is to use the L → rule with the formula P (x) → Q and we have to prove the LJB-sequent
to which no rule applies. The second is to use this same rule with the formula P (x) → Q inside the brackets. In this case we have to move the brackets and we obtain the LJB-sequent
to which no rule applies. The third is to use this same rule with the formula A and we have to prove the LJB-sequent
in this case the search continues as follows
and the branch is pruned because the sequent A, [P (x) → Q] x , (P (x) → Q) Q appears previously.
Equivalence
In this section, we want to prove the equivalence of the systems LJ + and LJB, i.e. if A is a formula, then the sequent A is provable in LJB if and only if it is provable in LJ + . Several methods can be used to prove this equivalence. Some are based on model constructions and others are based on proof transformations. In proof transformation based methods, we first have to define a translation of LJBsequents to LJ + -sequents. Again there are several possibilities. One of them is to introduce existential quantifiers to replace the brackets and translate, for instance, the sequent
We have chosen another translation by introducing a distinct free variable for each variable bound by brackets. The LJB-sequent
Notice that this LJB-sequent could also be translated as
Thus our translation will not be a function mapping LJB-sequents to LJ + -sequents, but rather a relation between LJB-sequents and LJ + -sequents. In the rest of this section, we first define this relation, and then prove the soundness and completeness of LJB with respect to LJ + .
Definition 3.1 (Fresh α-variants and flattening) Let Γ
A be a LJBsequent, a fresh α-variant of Γ A is a LJB-sequent α-equivalent to Γ A satisfying Barendregt's condition, i.e. where the bound variables are distinct and distinct from the free variables.
A LJ + -sequent ∆ B is said to be a flattening of a LJB-sequent Γ A, if it is obtained by erasing all the brackets in a fresh α-variant of Γ A. Definition 3.2 (α-equivalence) Two LJ + -sequents Γ A and Γ A are said to be α-equivalent if they differ only by the names of some bound and free variables, i.e. if there exists two substitutions σ and σ such that σ(Γ A) is α-equivalent to Γ A and σ (Γ A ) is α-equivalent to Γ A.
This relation is an equivalence relation. If two LJ + -sequents are flattenings of the same LJB-sequent, then they are α-equivalent. For instance, the LJB-
has a flattening
and also a flattening
and these two sequents are α-equivalent.
If two LJ + -sequents are α-equivalent then one has a derivation of height n if and only if the other does. Thus, if a flattening of a LJB-sequent has a derivation of height n, then all do. 
E is a fresh α-variant of C(I, [Σ] V ) A and thus ∆ E is also a flattening of C (I , [Σ ] V ) E. Thus ∆ E and ∆ E are two flattenings of the same LJB-sequent. Hence they are α-equivalent and if one has a derivation then so does the other and the derivations have the same height.
The case of the second rule is trivial. For the third rule, the context Γ has the form C(I, I) and Γ = C(I). The LJ + -sequent ∆ E is obtained by erasing the brackets in a fresh α-variant C (I 1 , I 2 ) E of C(I, I) A. Thus, ∆ = Σ, Ξ 1 , Ξ 2 where Ξ 1 is the set obtained by erasing the brackets in I 1 and Ξ 2 in I 2 . Let y be the variables bound by the brackets in I 1 . Then Ξ 2 has the form (y /y)Ξ 1 for some variables y . The sequent C (I 2 ) E is a fresh α-variant of C(I) A, thus the sequent Σ, Ξ 2 E is a flattening of C(I) A. If ∆ E has a derivation, then substituting y by y in this derivation yields a derivation of the same height of the sequent ∆, Ξ 2 , Ξ 2 E and Proposition 3.1 yields a derivation of the same height of ∆, Ξ 2 E. Thus, one flattening of Γ A has a derivation, hence all do and the derivations have the same height. Conversely, the sequent ∆ E is obtained by erasing the brackets in a fresh α-variant C (I ) E of C(I) A. Thus, ∆ = Σ , Ξ where Ξ is the set obtained by erasing the brackets in I . Let y be the variables bound in I and y be fresh variables. The sequent Σ, Ξ , (y /y)Ξ E is a flattening of Γ A. If ∆ E has a derivation, then so does Σ, Ξ , (y /y)Ξ E and the derivations have the same height. Thus, one flattening of Γ A has a derivation, hence all do and the derivations have the same height. Proposition 3.3 Let Γ and ∆ be two LJB-contexts, A be a formula and V be a set of variables such that A has no free variables in V . Let
Proof. As A has no free variables in V , the LJB-sequent The LJ + -sequents Σ 1 E 1 and Σ E are α-equivalent because they are flattenings of the same LJB-sequent, and so are Σ 2 E 2 and Σ E . By transitivity, the LJ + -sequents Σ 1 E 1 and Σ 2 E 2 are α-equivalent.
Proposition 3.4 Let Γ and ∆ be two LJB-contexts, A be a formula and V be a set of variables such that A has no free variables in V . Let
Proof. As a corollary of Proposition 3.3.
Proposition 3.5 (Soundness)
If the sequent A has a derivation in LJB, then it has also a derivation in LJ + .
Proof. We prove, more generally, that if the LJB-sequent Γ A has a derivation in LJB then all its flattening have a derivation in LJ + . We proceed by induction on the structure of the derivation of Γ A.
• If the last rule is L →
A is atomic and has no free variables in V 1 ∪V 2 ∪...∪V i−1 , then we consider a fresh α-variant of Γ A. The variables bound in this variant are not free in A 1 , ..., A n . Let ∆ E be the LJ + -sequent obtained by erasing the brackets in this variant. Let E 1 , ..., E n be α-variants of A 1 , ..., A n where the bound variables do not appear in Γ . The LJ + -sequents ∆ E 1 , ..., ∆ E n are flattenings of Γ A 1 , ..., Γ A n . Thus, by the induction hypothesis, they have derivations in LJ + . Applying the L → rule of LJ + we get a derivation of ∆ E and then of ∆ A as A and E are α-equivalent. Using Proposition 3.2, Proposition 3.4, an induction on i and the fact that A has no free variables in V 1 ∪ V 2 ∪ ... ∪ V i−1 , we get a derivation of a flattening of Γ A. One flattening of Γ A is derivable, hence all are.
• If the last rule is Finally, notice that as ∀x B has no free variable in V , every flattening of [Γ] V ∀x B is α-equivalent to a flattening of Γ ∀x B. Thus, the LJBsequent Γ ∀x B has a derivable flattening. One flattening of Γ ∀x B is derivable, hence all are.
• If the last rule is R → (Γ, B)↓ C Γ B → C then, by the induction hypothesis, the LJB-sequent (Γ, B)↓ C has a derivable flattening. By Proposition 3.2, the LJB-sequent Γ, B C has a derivable flattening. This flattening has the form ∆, B C . Applying the R → rule of LJ + , we get a proof of ∆ B → C and this LJ + -sequent is a flattening of Γ B → C. One flattening of Γ B → C is derivable, hence all are. Proposition 3.6 (Completeness) If the sequent A has a derivation in LJ + , then it also has a derivation in LJB.
Proof. We prove, more generally, that if a flattening ∆ E of Γ A has a derivation π in LJ + , then the LJB-sequent Γ A has a derivation in LJB. We proceed by induction on the height of the derivation π.
• If the last rule is L → then E is atomic, the formulae A and E are identical, ∆ contains a formula of the form A 1 → ... → A n → A and the sequents ∆ A 1 , ..., ∆ A n have derivations smaller than π.
Thus, the context Γ contains a formula B, corresponding to the formula A 1 → ... → A n → A through flattening, and Γ has the form
The formula B has the form C 1 → ... → C n → C, where C is an atomic formula. Renaming in C the variables of V 1 ∪ V 2 ∪ ... ∪ V i−1 with variables not free in A yields the formula A. Hence C = A and has no free variables in
and ∆ A be a flattening of Γ * A. Using Proposition 3.4, an induction on i and the fact that A has no free variables in V 1 ∪V 2 ∪...∪V i−1 , we get that the LJ + -sequents ∆ A and ∆ A are α-equivalent. Thus, there exists a substitution σ such that σ(∆ A) is α-equivalent to ∆ A. The formula σA i is α-equivalent to C i .
The LJ + -sequents ∆ A i have derivations smaller than π thus, so do the LJ + -sequents σ(∆ A i ), i.e. σ∆ C i . Let C i be an α-variant of C i where the bound variables do not appear in σ∆. The sequents σ∆ C i have derivations smaller than π and they are flattenings of Γ * C i .
Thus, the LJB-sequents Γ * C i have flattenings that have derivations smaller than π. By Proposition 3.2, so do the sequents Γ * ↓ C 1 , ..., Γ * ↓ C n . By the induction hypothesis, the sequents Γ * ↓ C 1 , ..., Γ * ↓ C n are derivable in LJB and we conclude with the L → rule of LJB.
• If the last rule is R∀, then the formula E has the form ∀x B, the variable x does not occur free in ∆ and the LJ + -sequent ∆ B has a derivation smaller than π. The formula A is α-equivalent to E and has the form ∀y B .
Let V be the set of variables bound in A. As stated in the definition of LJB, the free and bound variables of A are disjoint and the free variables of A and E are the same. Thus the bound variables of A are not free in E = ∀x B, and V − {x} and F V (B) are disjoint.
Let σ be a substitution renaming all the variables of V with fresh variables and σ its restriction to V − {x}.
As the LJ
+ -sequent ∆ B has a derivation smaller than π, so does the LJ + -sequent σ ∆ σ B.
As the domain of σ and F V (B) are disjoint, σ B = B. Moreover as x is not free in ∆, we have σ∆ = σ ∆. Thus, the LJ + -sequent σ∆ B has a derivation smaller than π.
The LJ
+ -sequent σ∆ B is α-equivalent to a flattening of [Γ] V B . Thus, the sequent [Γ] V B has a flattening that has a derivation smaller than π. By Proposition 3.2, so does the sequent [Γ] V ↓ B . By the induction hypothesis, the sequent [Γ] V ↓ B has a derivation in LJB and we conclude with the R∀ rule of LJB.
• If the last rule is R → then the formula E has the form B → C, the formula A has the form B → C where B is α-equivalent to B and C to C , and the LJ + -sequent ∆, B C has a derivation smaller than π. The LJ + -sequent ∆, B C is a flattening of Γ, B C . Thus, the LJBsequent Γ, B C has a flattening that has a derivation smaller than π. By Proposition 3.2, the LJB-sequent (Γ, B )↓ C has a flattening that has a derivation smaller than π. By the induction hypothesis, the LJBsequent (Γ, B )↓ C has a derivation in LJB and we conclude with the R → rule of LJB.
Decidability
To show that provability in the system LJB is decidable, we consider a closed formula E where all bound variables are distinct. The formulae occurring in a derivation of E in LJB are pieces of E.
A position f of E is said to be in the scope of a variable x if the unique position of E labeled by ∀x is a strict prefix of f .
A variable y is said to be in the scope of x if the unique position of E labeled by ∀x is a strict prefix of the unique position of E labeled by ∀y. This relation is obviously transitive.
Let V (x) be the set of all variables bound in the unique piece of E of the form ∀x A. This set can alternatively be defined as the set containing x and the variables y's in the scope of x in E. All the sets of variables occurring as a subscript of brackets in a derivation of E have the form V (x) for some variable x of E.
As E is a closed formula where all the bound variables are distinct, if a variable x occurs free in the formula associated to a position f of E, then f is in the scope of x. Proposition 4.1 If the position f is in the scope of a variable x and the formula associated to f has a free occurrence of a variable y then either x = y or x is in the scope of y or else y is in the scope of x.
Proof. Let g be the unique position of E labeled by ∀x and h the unique position of E labeled by ∀y. Both g and h are prefixes of f . Hence either g = h or h is a strict prefix of g or else g is a strict prefix of h.
Proposition 4.2
If the variable z is in the scope both of x and of y then either x = y or x is in the scope of y or else y is in the scope of x.
Proof. Let f be the unique position of E labeled by ∀x, g the unique position of E labeled by ∀y and h the unique position of E labeled by ∀z. Both f and g are prefixes of h. Hence either f = g or g is a strict prefix of f or else f is a strict prefix of g. 
Proof. By induction on the depth of [Γ] V (x)
. First, note that the variable z occurs free in an item I of Γ and is not a member of V (x). As [Γ] V (x) is normal, I has a free variable y in the set V (x). If I is a formula then let f be its occurrence in E. The occurrence f is in the scope of y in E. As y is in V (x) then either y = x or y is in the scope of x. In both cases, f is in the scope of x in E. Hence, by Proposition 4.1, as the variable z is free in I, either x = z or x is in the scope of z or z is in the scope of x. As, moreover, z is not in V (x) then x is in the scope of z.
If I is itself an item of the form [Γ ] V (x ) , then, by the induction hypothesis x is in the scope of all the free variables of [Γ ] V (x ) , and in particular x is in the scope of y and z. As y is in V (x) then either y = x or y is in the scope of x. In both cases x is in the scope of x. Hence by Proposition 4.2, either x = z or x is in the scope of z or z is in the scope of x. As, moreover, z is not in V (x) then x is in the scope of z.
, the variable x is in the scope of x.
has a free variable y in the set V (x) and, by Proposition 4.3, x is in the scope of y. As y is in V (x) then either y = x or y is in the scope of x. In both cases x is in the scope of x. Proposition 4.5 Let E be a closed formula, S the finite set of the pieces of E and d the maximum depth of nested variables in E. Let T be the finite set of LJB-sequents formed with formulae of S, whose subscripts are of the form V (x) for some variable x of E and whose depth is bounded by d. Then, only LJB-sequents of T can occur in a proof of E.
Proof. As already noticed, all the formulae occurring in a derivation of E are pieces of E and all subscripts occurring in a derivation of E are of the form V (x) for some variable x of E. By Proposition 4.4, the depth of the LJB-sequents occurring in a derivation of E is bounded by d. Proposition 4.6 If a LJB-sequent Γ A has a derivation, then it has a non redundant derivation, i.e. a derivation where the same sequent does not occur twice in the same branch.
Proof. By induction on the number of sequents occurrences in the proof. Consider a redundant proof where the LJB-sequent Γ A occurs twice in the same branch. We can replace the bigger proof of this sequent by the smaller one, yielding a smaller proof, to which we apply the induction hypothesis.
The following proposition is a straightforward consequence of Propositions 4.5 and 4.6.
Proposition 4.7 Provability in the system LJB is decidable.
Remark. If n is the size of the formula A, then the cardinal of S is exponential in n and that of T doubly exponential, where S and T are as defined in Proposition 4.5. Thus a doubly exponential decision algorithm can be obtained from any algorithm visiting each sequent at most once.
Remark. This decidability proof uses the fact that the R∀ rule binds all the variables bound in the right hand side of the sequent and not just x. The termination of proof search in the simpler system where this rule binds the variable x only is left open.
Application to simple type theory and system F
In [2] we have given a presentation of simple type theory (higher-order logic) as a theory in first-order predicate logic. We have also given a presentation of this theory in deduction modulo [3] where axioms are replaced by rewrite rules. For instance when we have a formula ∀x ε(x) and we substitute x by the terṁ →(y, z) we have to normalize the formula ε(→(y, z)) yielding ε(y) → ε(z). We have shown that simple type theory can be presented with rewrite rules only and no axioms. When we have a theory in deduction modulo formed by a confluent and terminating rewrite system and no axioms and with the cut elimination property, we can decide if a positive normal formula is provable or not in this theory. Indeed, as we never substitute variables in a derivation, normal formulae remain normal and the rewrite rules can never be used. Thus, a normal formula is provable in this theory if and only if it is provable in predicate logic.
Thus, inhabitation in the positive minimal fragment of simple type theory is decidable.
We obtain also this way a new decidability proof for the positive fragment of system F [8] , while the general inhabitation problem for system F is known to be undecidable [7] .
Proposition 5.1 Inhabitation in the positive fragment of system F is decidable.
Proof. To each type of system F we associate a formula in minimal predicate logic, with a single unary predicate ε as in [2] . Φ(X) = ε(X)
For instance Φ(∀X (X → X)) = ∀X (ε(X) → ε(X)).
As there is no substitution of variables in the positive fragment, a positive type T is inhabited in system F if and only if the formula Φ(T ) is provable in minimal predicate logic. Thus inhabitation for positive types in system F is decidable.
Let us consider some examples. The system LJB allows to show that the type of Example 1 is empty in System F, while that of Example 2, its prenex form, is inhabited. For ease of reading, we write X instead of ε(X). Example 1. Let us try to prove the inhabitation of the type
Again, restricting to non redundant proofs prunes this branch. We can check that the other branches are pruned in the same way. Thus, this type is empty.
Conclusion
It is well known that variable names are irrelevant in logic and that they can be replaced by other scoping mechanisms. We have shown in this paper that replacing the eigenvariable condition by an appropriate bracketing mechanism simplifies the decision algorithm of the positive part of minimal predicate logic.
This bracketing mechanism could be used in other situations where we need to handle fresh variables, but its generality still needs to be investigated.
